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NOTE
THE ATTORNEY, CLIENT AND ...

THE

GOVERNMENT?: A NEW DIMENSION TO THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT PROTECTION IN THE
POST-ENRON ERA
Melissa L. Nuflez*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are the CEO of a large publicly traded corporation.
You just discovered that some of your officers and directors have
manipulated earnings, hidden liabilities, and illegally kept information from you and your auditing firm. Now, along with having to
adjust your financial statements and watch your stock price sink, the
Securities and Exchange Commission wants to investigate your corporation, your management, and you. The SEC asks you for your cooperation in its informal investigation. You want to comply because you
would rather make them happy and avoid an official, and very public,
investigation of the corporation and everyone involved. So you turn
over internal investigations and other otherwise privileged materials
in the hopes that you can satisfy the SEC that you are turning the
company around and eliminating the problem. But now your shareholders, shocked by the drop in their stock value, file a shareholder
derivative action as a result of the accounting irregularities. Because
you have disclosed everything related to the accounting fraud to the
SEC, these shareholders can now discover all of this once privileged
information and your corporation could be swamped in costly litigation for years, effectively destroying the company and your position in
it.
*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., BusinessEconomics & Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004.
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Today's business culture places a premium on financial honesty
and minimal controversy. Corporations, encouraged by federal legislation, seek to avoid scrutiny by strengthening internal controls that
ensure compliance with securities laws. Yet, the government and public still distrust corporations and their directors and officers. This business climate has paved the way for increased use of corporate internal
investigations and an increased desire by corporate outsiders to
acquire the information contained in those investigations. Although
corporations have incentives to disclose such information to the government, they have little incentive to disclose it to private parties.'
Corporations often face a difficult decision: If they disclose confidential material to the government they may thereby be forced to disclose
2
it to private parties.
Over the past three decades, courts have struggled to find rules to
fairly govern discovery of privileged or protected materials after those
materials have been disclosed to a government agency. One method
has been to bar subsequent discovery of materials once protected by
attorney-client privilege under a "limited waiver" theory. - Another
method allows discovery of any materials previously disclosed, whether
they were originally protected by attorney-client privilege or the work
product doctrine, no matter what the circumstances of the disclosure. 4 Still another method has allowed the protection provided by
the work product doctrine to survive disclosure to the government
when there has been a confidentiality agreement.5 The circuits that
have decided this issue do not agree and many circuits have yet to
choose how they will approach this issue.
As courts face these issues in the future, they should attempt to
find rules that balance the policy concerns underlying both attorneyclient privilege and work product protection. The Second Circuit did
this best, providing that once a corporation has disclosed protected
materials to the government, the corporation waives its attorney-client
privilege as to those materials. 6 However, if the corporation negotiI See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
303-06 (6th Cir. 2002).
2 See generallyJames D. Cox, Insider TradingRegulation and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 488-501 (1986) (analyzing market
incentives for disclosing information).
3 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc).
4 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 303-06.
5 See Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt
Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
6 Id. at 235-36.
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the corpoated with the government for a confidentiality agreement,
materials
those
over
protection
its work product
ration has not waived
7
as to third parties.

PROBLEM: WHAT IT HAS
1. THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE
DONE TO ENCOURAGE DISCLOSURE

The Securities and Exchange Commission
eye of the SEC, it potentially
Once a corporation has caught the
the government as well as devastatfaces serious penalties imposed by
from private litigation and loss of
ing business consequences resulting
the ability to seek injunctions, restiinvestor confidence. The SEC has
deny corporations and individuals
tution, disgorgement, and can also
individuals from being officers
certain privileges, such as precluding
the future, among other forms of
or directors of public companies in
8
is authorized to refer cases to crimisanctions. In addition, the SEC
ofJustice .9 As a result, corponal authorities, such as the Department
with the SEC in the hopes that
rations have great incentives to comply
penalties or even a decision not
such compliance will result in lighter
0
to pursue a formal investigation.'
penalties resulting from an
The idea that disclosure may lighten
on the part of corporations. The
investigation is not wishful thinking
SEC by waiving attorney-client and
benefits of cooperation with the
from the cases discussed later
work product privileges can be inferred
in these cases likely would
1
in this Note. The corporations involved
to the SEC had they not
not have disclosed privileged materials
such disclosure.
believed that they would benefit from
has made it quite clear that
But more than this, the SEC itself
privileges can substantially
waiving attorney-client and work product
In 2001, the SEC
benefit a corporation under investigation.
A.

7 Id. at 236.
Div. of
& Ira L. Brandriss, Staff Attorney,
8 Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir.
a Dual
of
Speech by SEC Staff: The Advantages
Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n;
Securities
U.S.
the
of
and Criminal Enforcement
System: Parallel Streams of Civil
(Sept. 19,
Symposium on Economic Crime
International
Laws, Address at the 16thv / n e w s / sp e e c h / sp e e c h ar c h iv e / 19 9 8 / sp c h 2 22 . h t m .
1998), http://www.sec.go
9 Id.
text.
10 See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying
F.3d at 235-36; Permian Corp. v.
9
Bros.,
Salmon
also
see
11 See infra Part 1II;
Indus., Inc. v.
n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Diversified
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219
concurring in
J.,
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Henley,
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611-12 (8th
re McKesson
(In
Inc.
v. McKesson HBOC,
part and dissenting in part); Aronson
31, 2005);
Mar.
Cal.
(N.D.
*6-7
WL 934331, at
HBOC, Inc.), No. 99-CV-20743, 2005
2003).
Cal.
(N.D.
487, 495-96
United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D.
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against a corporation whose subannounced it would not take action
Gisela de Leon-Meredith,
sidiary, by way of acts of its controller,records to be inaccurate and
"caused the parent company's books and
1 2 In
covered up those facts."
then
and
misstated,
reports
its periodic
the
not to take any action in this case,
its discussion of how it decided
and
"whether,
when deciding
SEC listed thirteen factors it considers
remediation and
self-reporting,
how much, to credit self-policing,
step of taking no enforcement
cooperation-from the extraordinary
seeking lighter sanctions, or
action to bringing reduced charges,
and
documents we use to announce
including mitigating language in
the
The eleventh factor considered
resolve enforcement actions. "1
following questions:
available to our staff the
Did the company promptly make
documentation reflecting
results of its review and provide sufficient
company identify possible vioits response to the situation? Did the
sufficient precision to facilitate
lative conduct and evidence with
those who violated the law?
prompt enforcement actions against
and probing written report
Did the company produce a thorough
Did the company voluntarily
detailing the findings of its review?
not directly request and otherwise
disclose information our staff did
company ask its employees to
might not have uncovered? Did the
to secure
staff and make all reasonable efforts
cooperate with our
14
such cooperation?
to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange
12 Report of Investigation Pursuant
to
on the Relationship of Cooperation
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement
Docket
SEC
76
44,969,
No.
Release
Act
Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange
at http://
Report of Investigation], available
[hereinafter
2001)
23,
(Oct.
296, 296
publish
to
chooses
The SEC
www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. importance is involved and the
of public
Section 21(a) reports "where a question
the
should be informed concerning
community,
financial
the
public, or at least
Inc.,
Spartek
re
response to it." In
nature of the situation and the Commission's
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Transfer
[1979
Exchange Act Release No. 15,567,
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/3481,961 (Feb. 14, 1979), available
"The SEC has issued Section 21(a)
concurring).
Loomis,
44969.htm (Comm'r
views on matters
unique matters, or to express its
reports with respect to novel or
C. Ferrara &
Ralph
enforcement proceedings."
where it has decided not to institute
597, 662
PLI/Corp
1085
Enforcement Proceeding,
Philip S. Khinda, Overview of an SEC
Trans[1997
39,156,
No.
Release
Co., Exchange Act
(1998) (citing In reW.R. Grace &
to
Pursuant
Report
1997);
30,
(Sept.
85,963
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
the
and
NASD
the
Act of 1934 Regarding
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
37,542, 62 SEC Docket 1375 (Aug. 8,
No.
Release
Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act
1996)).
(listing the
note 12, at 298; see id. at 298-99
13 Report of Investigation, supra
thirteen factors).
14 Id. at 299.
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not taking action against the
In taking the "extraordinary step" of
15
that
parent company, the SEC explained
to our staff.
[t]he company pledged and gave complete cooperationinvestigation,
internal
its
of
details
It provided the staff with... the
of Meredith and
including notes and transcripts of interviewsprivilege, work product
others; and it did not invoke the attorney-client to any facts uncovered
with respect
protection or other privileges orprotections
6
in the investigation.'

did to cooperate with the
While this was not all the company
factor in the SEC's decision.
SEC,' 7 it appears to be an important
to corporations under informal
This release sends a clear message
privileges can make the process
investigation by the SEC that waiving
the SEC to drop the investigamuch easier and perhaps even prompt
tion completely.
B.

The Department ofJustice

disclosure of privileged materThe SEC is not alone in rewarding
has gone so far as to announce an
ials. The Department of Justice
and
waiver of attorney-client privilege
official policy rewarding the
8
In his discussion of how prosecutors
work product protection.'
a corporation with a crime, the
should determine whether to charge
several factors, one of which was
Deputy Attorney General listed
disclosure of wrongdoings
"It]he corporation's timely and voluntary
of its agents,
investigation
in the
and its willingness to cooperate
and work
attorney-client
of the corporate
including, if necessary, the waiver
corporation
a
19
that "granting
product privileges." He further explains
governbe considered in the course of the
immunity or amnesty 2may
0 The memorandum goes on to explain that
ment's investigation."
with other agencies which
when the DOJ is working in conjunction
programs," like the SEC, it will
have "formal voluntary disclosure
of their compliance programs, to
encourage corporations "as part
to disclose their findings" irre21
conduct internal investigations and
privileged or not.
findings were originally
spective of whether those

15 Id. at 298.
16 Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
strengthprovided complete cooperation and
17 See id. (noting that the company
ened its final reporting processes).
Heads
Attorney Gen. to All Component
18 See Memorandum from the Deputy
16, 1999),
(June
Corporations
Against
Charges
C h ar g in gc o r p s 'h t m l .
and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal
v / c ri m in al / f ra u d / p o li c y /
http://www.usdoj.go
at
available
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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Although the memorandum makes quite clear that voluntary disclosure of privileged material can significantly benefit a corporation
under investigation, it also points out that this type of waiver is just
22
one factor of many a prosecutor may consider.
C.

The Issue: To Disclose or Not to Disclose

Although the perks of waiving privileges may be tempting, corporations should be wary of disclosing privileged materials to government agencies. A corporation may escape formal investigation by the
SEC or obtain a more lenient settlement, but this may not make up
for the damage that could be caused by subsequent litigants who are
able to obtain the disclosed materials because they are no longer
privileged.
A corporation must make a decision about what is in its best interests, weighing the benefits and detriments of voluntarily disclosing
privileged material to the government. When faced with this decision,
corporations turn to their attorneys for advice. In order to provide
clients with the best service, attorneys must understand how the law
handles this situation. Because the case law in this area is, and has
been for a long time, inconsistent, 2 - it is difficult for attorneys to accurately predict how courts may view this type of voluntary disclosure in
future litigation. It is imperative that counsel is aware of the issues
that courts take into consideration when deciding whether corporations have waived their privileges and especially what courts in their
jurisdiction have decided on this issue. In circuits where there has
been no definite decision on this issue, attorneys face the challenge of
attempting to predict how district courts will analyze this problem
given the many different examples set by other circuits.
Not only do corporations and attorneys in undecided circuits face
uncertainty, but so do those in circuits which have adopted clear rules.
Due to the wide variance between the circuits on this issue, even corporations and attorneys in circuits where a clear rule has been delineated may be surprised by a change in the law in this area. All of this
uncertainty makes the decision of whether to disclose protected
materials to the government a difficult one; one that does not need to
be so difficult.
22 Id. ("The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation's
privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness
of a corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and complete information as only one factor in evaluating the corporation's cooperation.").
23 See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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supporting the different
This Note will discuss the case law
faced with these issues and
approaches that courts have taken when
24
Second Circuit and adopted
show why the approach crafted by the
District of California in the
by a recent decision of the Northern
25
to handle these difficult issues.
Ninth Circuit offers the best way
basic rules governing attorneyPart II of this Note will explain the
This Part will discuss
client privilege and work product protection.
can be waived,
when these protections apply, how these protections
Part III will
uphold.
to
meant
and what policies these protections are
of the
examples
issue, providing
discuss the current case law on this
created. Part IV analyzes the
26
many different rules that circuits have
in the Ninth Circuit, demoncase law coming from a district court
approach to the issue. These
strating a recent shift in that court's
are the most current attempt
cases are particularly important as they
Part V analyzes the different
to establish a rule governing this issue.
V and discusses the arguments
methods described in Parts III and
to support their holdings, points
that the different circuits have used
and the strengths of others,
out the flaws in many of the arguments
by the Second Circuit and by a
and explains why the rule expounded
of California best upholds the
recent decision of the Northern District
privilege and work-product
public policy behind both attorney-client
protection.

II.
A.

PROTECTIONS
EXPLANATION OF PRIVILEGE

Waiver
Attorney-Client Privilege: Rule, Policy, and

enjoy the protections of the
Corporations, as well as individuals,
2 7 It is the "oldest of the privileges for confiattorney-client privilege.
PartSteinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt
24 Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v.
ners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
No.
Inc. (In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.),
25 Aronson v. McKesson HBOC,
2005).
31,
Cal. Mar.
99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331 (N.D.
26 Id.
R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). How27 United States v. Louisville & Nashville
applies to corporations has been debated.
ever, the extent to which the privilege
to attorwhether employee communications
There are competing tests to determine
the
called
test,
One
as a corporate communication.
neys are considered privileged that
the
if
privileged
an employee's statement is only
"control group test," provides
decision
a
in
part
or even to take a substantial
employee is "in a position to control
or
may take upon the advice of the attorney,
corporation
the
about any action which
of
City
authority."
that
has
which
body or group
if he is an authorized member of a
Another
1962).
210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
provides that
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dential communications known to the common law." 28 The protec-

tion is limited, however, to communication with attorneys, 2 9 and
therefore offers more narrow protection than the work product doctrine may offer. 30 The attorney-client privilege rule applies
only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law
or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and

an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is
sufficiently identified with the corporation ... where the employee makes
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the
corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1970), affJd
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the "control group test," reasoning that it "frustrates the very purpose of the privilege
by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation." Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). Instead the court adopted a "case-by-case"
approach. Id. at 396. It has been suggested that the Court here created six different
factors to consider when deciding if communications between employees and corporate counsel are privileged: (1) "the communication must be made by a corporate
employee upon an order of a corporate superior, and it must be necessary for the
corporation to secure legal advice"; (2) the information "must not be available to
upper level management"; (3) the communication "must concern matters within the
scope of the employee's corporate duties"; (4) "the employees must be aware that
their communication with counsel was for the purpose of rendering legal advice to
the corporation"; (5) "the communications must be ordered to remain confidential";
and (6) the "court may consider the identity and resources of the opposing party."
Rashelle C. Tanner, Adjudicator or Advocate? Attorneys' Responsibilities Under SarbanesOxley, FOR DEF., Jan. 2003, at 27, 29. Thus, attorneys may face further confusion in
determining whether certain communications are protected by attorney client privilege at all as they attempt to apply this list of factors.
28 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
29 Id. at 395.
30 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (explaining that attorney work
product includes "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible" things).
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a crime or tort; and (4) the
31
not (d) for the purpose of committing
(b) not waived by the client.
and
claimed
(a)
been
has
privilege
that the attorney-client priviAccordingly, if a court determines
or documents requested in
lege originally applied to communications
in
the privilege has not been waived
discovery, it must establish that
privithat
or information still retain
order3 2to ensure that the materials
occurs when there is discloprivilege
Waiver of attorney-client
lege.
3 3 However, waiver
to a third party.
sure of the privileged material
is made in order to prepare a
does not occur where the3 4disclosure
The issue of when waiver of attorney-clijoint or common defense.
and
disagreement between circuits
ent privilege occurs has created
and their attorneys.
confusion among corporations
constitute a waiver of the attorneyIn determining what should
the policy behind the privilege.
client privilege, it is useful to examine
the privilege is meant to "encourage
The Supreme Court stated that
clients
between attorneys and their
full and frank communication
public
serves
advocacy
legal advice or
and .... recognizes that sound
fully
being
lawyer's
. . depends upon the
ends and that such advice.
ensure
to
is
3 5 If the purpose of the privilege
informed by the client."
to
and can provide adequate service
that attorneys are fully informed
disthe privilege to cover materials
their clients, continuing to allow
the
because
is
not serve this goal. This
closed to the government does
his
to
disclosed the information
client in this situation has already
to
hindrance to the attorney's ability
attorney and there is no further
the materials
they have decided to disclose
represent his client3 once
6
to the government.
and Waiver
Work Product Protection:Rule, Policy,
to shield internal investigations
Corporations can also attempt
by invoking the protection of the
and other documents from discovery
B.

(D. Mass.
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
31 United States v. United Shoe
Diversicase."
cited
"frequently
this rule from this
1950). The Eighth Circuit applied
(panel).
1977)
Cir.
(8th
601
F.2d 596,
fied Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
Mach.,
Shoe
United
e.g.,
See,
32
disclosure to a
81 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[S]ubsequent
72,
33 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d
whatever
eliminates
attorney
his
with
third party by the party of a communication
disclobecause
whether
possessed,
have originally
privilege the communication may
waiver
a
as
or
confidentiality is no longer intended
sure is viewed as an indication that
of the privilege.").
United
892 F.2d 237, 243-45 (2d Cir. 1989);
34 See United States v. Schwimmer,
1336-37 (7th Cir. 1979).
States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321,
U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
35 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
of this issue.
discussion
further
for
36 See infra Part V
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work product doctrine. The work product doctrine can potentially
protect more than the attorney-client privilege because it is not limited only to communications between clients and attorneys.3 7 The
work product doctrine protects "written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections, ' 38 often called attorney work product, from discovery when prepared for or by an attorney in
anticipation of litigation. 39
Similar to attorney-client privilege, work product protection can
be waived. As a general rule, waiver of work product protection
40
occurs when a party shares protected material with an adversary.
This waiver rule varies from the rule governing attorney-client privilege in that it is specific to disclosure of the material to an adversary.
Work product protection is waived when "disclosure is inconsistent
with maintaining secrecy from possible adversaries. '4 1 Therefore,
attorney-client privilege will generally be waived when protected material is disclosed to any third person, but to show waiver of work product protection, that third person must be at least a potential
adversary. 42 Additionally, the different policies each doctrine is
meant to foster can affect whether a protection has been waived; if
37 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
38 Id. at 510. This rule is now codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) (3), which provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or far that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
39 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
304 (6th Cir. 2002). Work product protection does not apply, however, to documents
addressing business, rather than legal, issues prepared by counsel. See In re Kidder
Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 462-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec.
Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S, 225, 239 (1975).
41 Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
42 See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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disclosure undermines the policy that originally protected the mate43
rial, it is more likely that a court will consider the protection waived.
The policy concerns underlying the work product doctrine differ
from those of the attorney-client privilege. Work product protection
ensures that an attorney may serve his client effectively without worrying that his work will later be discoverable in court.4 4 The Supreme
Court stated that without protection for attorney work product "much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts... would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice
and in the preparation of cases for trial." 45 Additionally, the doctrine
ensures that discovery serves its intended purpose of bringing the facts
of the case to light and does not enable lawyers to piggyback on the
46
work of opposing counsel.
As a result, whether attorney-client privilege or work product protection applies to the materials in question will affect how a court
decides whether or not a corporation has waived its protection.
III.

PRIVILEGE WAIVER CASE LAw: THE MANY APPROACHES TO WAIVER

While the rules and policies behind attorney-client privilege and
work product protection may seem clear, courts have not applied
them consistently. In cases where a party has previously disclosed protected material to a government agency, such as the SEC, courts have
not agreed whether subsequent litigants have a right to discovery of
the once-protected materials. 47 Some courts have created bright line
rules, others are more flexible. 48 Those applying bright line rules are
43 C.f. McMorgan & Co. v. First Cal. Mortgage Co., 931 F. Supp. 703, 709 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (explaining that due to the differing policies underlying the two forms of
privilege, attorney-client privilege does not apply when the materials were never
intended to be kept confidential, but attorney work product protection is not necessarily waived in this situation).
44 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
45 Id.at 511.
46 Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) (reasoning that "(dliscovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits
or on wits borrowed from the adversary").
47 Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (holding that disclosure to the government does not waive attorney-client
privilege), with Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
306-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that disclosure to the government waives both attorney-client privilege and work product protection).
48 Compare Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611 (disclosure to the government neverwaives
attorney-client privilege), with Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners,

-L'
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1-

to a government agency of
in conflict: One court holds that disclosure
privilege never waives that privimaterials protected by attorney-client
49 while another court says that in such a situalege as to other parties,
waived. 0 Similar disparities
tion attorney-client privilege is always
once protected as work
exist in the law applying to materials
product.5 1
rules consider such things as
Courts that do not agree with such
agency entered into a confiwhether the party and the government
Brothers Treasury Litigation v. Steindentiality agreement. In Salmon
52
Partners,L.P.), the Second Circuit
hardt Partners,L.P. (In re Steinhardt
of waiver, acknowledging that in
declined to adopt a bright line rule
agreement has
a confidentiality
5 3
some circumstances, such as when
not be appropriate.
been negotiated, waiver may
determined what law should
Because the Supreme Court has not
of appeal have discretion to choose
apply in cases like this, the courts
not all circuits have taken a
which methods suit them. However,
courts and attorneys in their jurisstance on the issue, leaving district
circumstance, district courts must
dictions with little guidance. In this
and determine which route is
look to what other circuits have done
to predict what districts courts will
most persuasive. Attorneys must try
they advise their clients about the
decide when faced with this issue as
to government agencies.
decision to disclose privileged material

to the
9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (disclosure
of
L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.),
circumstances
protection depending on the
government may waive work product
the waiver).
49 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
50 Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 303-04.
is
protection is always waived when there
51 Compare id. at 306-07 (work product
protection
product
(work
Bros., 9 F.3d at 236
disclosure to an adversary), with Salmon
or
parties signed a confidentiality agreement
the
where
waived
be
may not necessarily
interest).
where the parties share a common
52 9 F.3d 230.
53 Id. at 236.
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. 4
Circuit'sApproach
Limited Waiver Doctrine5 The Eighth's
to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

an exception to the waiver
In 1977, the Eighth Circuit established
5
doctrine . 5 The exception
provision of the attorney-client privilege
attorney-client privilege over docuallowed a corporation to retain its
over to the SEC. The court
ments even if they were voluntarily turned
waiver" of the attorney-client
described56 this act as a "limited
privilege .
Eighth Circuit after the disDiversified Industries appealed to the
the attorney-client privilege and
trict court denied protection under
documents prepared by Diversithe work product doctrine of several
involved in proxy fight litigation
fied's attorneys. Diversified had been
may have been engaging in an
when it came to light that Diversified
antitrust laws. The proxy fight
unlawful conspiracy as well as violating
firm to conduct an
later hired a 5law
7
litigation settled, and Diversified
its business practices.
internal investigation of
its own
fight litigation, the SEC began
As a result of the proxy
the
58
the course of its investigation, 59
investigation of Diversified. In
question.
the documents in
60
SEC issued a subpoena demanding
documents to the SEC.
the
produced
voluntarily
Diversified
contracted partner,
In a second round of litigation, Diversified'smaterial handed over
of the
Weatherhead Company, sought discovery
protected
61 Diversified argued that the documents were
62 The
to the SEC.
doctrine.
work product
the
and
privilege
attorney-client
by the
the case rejected Diversified's work
three-judge panel that first heard
the documents were not prepared
product argument, concluding that
the documents were prepared in
in anticipation of litigation because
the purpose of informing the corpothe regular course of business for
to avoid the same problems in the
ration about the situation and how
See, e.g.,
to as "selective waiver" by many courts.
54 The doctrine is also referred
(3d Cir.
n.7
&
1423
1414,
F.2d
951
of the Phil.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic
as the
to
the rule in Diversified is often referred
1991); id. at 1423 n.7 ("Although
'limited'
word
the
not to use that phrase because
'limited waiver rule,' we prefer
selective and partial.").
waivers:
of
refers to two distinct types
(en
572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
Meredith,
v.
Inc.
55 Diversified Indus.,
banc).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 599-600 (panel).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 611 (en banc).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 600 (panel).
62 Id. at 599.
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the court decided that the
63
On hearing the case en banc,
future.
interattorneys, including employee
report prepared by Diversified's
docuother
but
privilege,
views, were entitled to the attorney-client
same
the
to
in discovery were not entitled
ments Weatherhead sought
Diversithe court was whether
64
The more difficult issue for
privilege.
report
privilege with respect to the
fied had waived its attorney-client
that
decided
court
The
it over to the SEC.
when it voluntarily turned
volunany
that
rule seemed to dictate
although the traditional waiver
in this case
material waived the privilege,
tary production of protected
was not entiand therefore Weatherhead65
the waiver was only limited
The court
or any parts thereof.
tled to discovery of the report
thwarting
of
may have the effect
explained that "[lt] o hold otherwise
independent
of corporations to employ
the developing procedure
to protect
order
in
them
and advise
- 66
outside counsel to investigate
.
customers
and
stockholders
stockholders, potential
privithat when the attorney-client
Thus, the Eighth Circuit held
the
to
of the privileged material
67
lege applies, voluntary production
This is
waive that privilege in the future.
SEC does not categorically
a confidenhave not even entered into
true where, as here, the parties
proproduct
SEC. However, because work
tiality agreement with the
sought in Diversified Industries,
tection never applied to the materials
the principle
68
cannot be seen to extend
Inc. v. Meredith, this holding
Since
product.
work
as
once protected
of limited waiver to materials
docwaiver
not overruled the limited
1977, the Eighth Circuit has

Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 610-11 (en banc).
cited
a limited waiver occurred, the court
65 Id. at 611. In its decision that only
1969)
Haw.
(D.
1123-24
Storck, 297 F. Supp. 1122,
Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v.
subsehearing cannot be admitted in a
suppression
a
from
(holding that testimony
1961),
Cir.
(4th
259
256,
F.2d
289
v. Goodman,
quent criminal trial) and United States
can invoke
14 (1961) (concluding that defendants
U.S.
368
grounds,
other
on
is
vacated
prosecution
unless
a subsequent investigation
the Fifth Amendment privilege in
banc).
(en
611
at
F.2d
Diversified, 572
barred by statute of limitations).
611.
at
F.2d
572
66 Diversified,
67 Id.
68 Id. at 604 (panel).
63
64
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trine. 69 However, other circuits have explicitly denounced the
70
doctrine.
B.

Rejection of Limited Waiver Doctrine:Absolute
Waiver of Both Protections

Courts applying this line of reasoning hold that any voluntary disclosure to a third party waives attorney-client privilege as to all others,
and if that third party is an adversary, then work product protection is
also waived. 7' Some consider this, the majority approach, pointing to
decisions from the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits. 72 However,
while the approach from these circuits does reject limited waiver of
attorney-client privilege, there does not seem to be a true majority
approach to waiver of work product protection.
In Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation),73 the Sixth Circuit adopted the opposite rule regarding
waiver than that espoused by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified. Tennessee Laborersillustrates the rule that disclosure to a third-party adversary
waives not only attorney-client privilege, but also work product protection.74 Tennessee Laborers involved the discovery of documents the
defendant, Columbia/HCA, claimed were covered by both attorneyclient privilege and work product protection. 75 Columbia/HCA had
previously disclosed the documents to the DOJ and other government
agencies when it was under investigation for alleged Medicare and
69 But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena, 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.
1988) (questioning Diversified's holding, arguing that "disclosure is inconsistent with
the confidential attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege" and that "'(a]
claim that a need for confidentiality must be respected in order to facilitate the seeking and rendering of informed legal service is not consistent with selective disclosure
when the claimant decides that the confidential materials can be put to other beneficial purposes'" (quotingjohn Doe Corp. v. United States (In reJohn Doe Corp.), 675
F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1982))).
70 See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289,
304 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685-86 (1st
Cir. 1997); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
71 Tenn. Laborers, 293 F.3d at 304-06.
72 See, e.g., Alec Koch, Note, Internal Corporateinvestigations: The Waiver of AttorneyClient Privilegeand Work-Product ProtectionThrough Voluntary Disclosures to the Government,
34 AM. CraM. L. REv. 347, 358-59 (1997).
73 293 F.3d 289.
74 Id. at 304-06.
75 Id. at 292.
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76
agreement, the DOJ agreed
Medicaid fraud. Under the disclosure
77 Subsequently, pridocuments.
to maintain the confidentiality of the
the activities the DOJ had
vate parties filed lawsuits stemming from
of
7 Not surprisingly, these parties requested discovery
investigated.
79
to the DOJ.
the materials disclosed
produce the documents by
Columbia defended its refusal to
citing the holding in
arguing that it had not waived its privileges,
it made with the DOJ
Diversified.80 It also argued that the agreement as to the plaintiffs, as
documents
preserved the confidentiality of the ,
The plaintiffs did not argue that
entities."'
they were not government
protected by attorney-client privithe documents were not originally
the court proceeded on the
lege or work product protection; thus,
privileged under both doctrines
assumption that the documents were
the disclosure to the DOJ had
and focused its analysis82on whether
waived these privileges.
privilege. After
The court first turned to waiver of attorney-client
the court rejected it "in any
examining the selective waiver doctrine,
83
that the doctrine has "litof its various forms." The court reasoned
frank communication between a client
tle, if any, relation to fostering
84 It argued the selective waiver doctrine
and his or her attorney."
into 'merely another brush
"transforms the attorney-client privilege
manipulated to gain tactical or
on an attorney's palette, utilized and
stated that "attorney-client privistrategic advantage.' "85 Further, it
and is "not a creature of conlege is a matter of common law right"

Id. at 291.
agreement were as follows:
Id. at 292. The terms of the confidentiality
information by one party to
or
"[T]he disclosure of any report, document,
privilege or claim
applicable
any
of
the other does not constitute a waiver
parties to the agreement reserve the
under the work product doctrine. Both
by the other party to the agreeright to contest the assertion of any privilege
by virtue of the disclosures
party,
ment, but will not argue that the disclosing
any applicable privilege or
waived
has
it makes pursuant to this agreement,
work product doctrine claim."
between Columbia/HCA and the DOJ).
Id. (quoting the confidentiality agreement
allowed the DOJ to disclose the information
This confidentiality agreement, however,
committees. See id. at 292 n.2.
to other government agencies and congressional
78 Id. at 292.
79 Id. at 293.
1978)).
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
80 Id. (citing Diversified Indus., Inc.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 294.
83 Id. at 302.
84 Id.
(In re
Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P.
85 Id. (quoting Salmon Bros. Treasury
230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d
76
77
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8 6 It
suit the whim of the moment."
to
parties
between
arranged
tract,
in
that selective waiver would assist
also rejected Diversifiedas reasoning
incentives to disclose privithe "truth finding process" by providing
by pointing out that private litileged materials to the government
the
part of finding the truth as
gants are just as important a
are
8 7
Finally, the court noted that defendants
government may be.
privilege, but rather choose
never forced to waive their attorney-client
of disclosure against the detrito do so after weighing the benefits
legitimate reason, given the policies
ments. Thus, the court found no
to support the doctrine of selecunderlying attorney-client privilege,
88
tive waiver.
issue of work product protection
The court then turned to the
privilege waiver laws are not
waiver. It first noted that attorney-client
of work product protection, and
the same as those governing waiver
conclusion that attorney-client privtherefore it did not follow from its
production protection was also
ilege had been waived that work
protection
8 9 Thus, when faced with a defendant claiming
waived.
determust analyze each separately to
under both doctrines, the court
90 However, this court stated that
mine whether there has been waiver.
work
two was that in order to waive
the only difference between the
not
adversary,
must be made to an
9I
product protection, the disclosure
privilege waiver.
attorney-client
in
case
the
is
as
party,
just any third
to prethe court stated, "It]he ability
In support of this conclusion,
in
articulated
is the chief reason
pare one's case in confidence, which
talkwith
protection[ ],has little to do
Hickman for the work product
92 Additionally, the court argued that the
ing to the Government."
like the waiver of attorney-client
waiver of work product protection,
93 The court did not analyze the effect
privilege, is a strategic choice.
of the confidentiality agreement.
law in the Sixth Circuit dicAs a result of this case, the prevailing
materipreviously disclosed protected
tates that when a defendant has
the
that is the defendant's adversary,
als to a government agency
privilege and its work proddefendant waives both its attorney-client

86
87

Id. at 303.
Id.

88
89
90

Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.

91

Id. at 306.

92
93

Hickman v. Taylor, 329
Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing
Id. at 306-07.

U.S. 495 (1947)).
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uct protection. 9 4 The result does not depend on whether the parties
entered into a confidentiality agreement.
C.

Case-by-Case Waiver Analysis: The Second Circuit's Compromise

The Second Circuit adopted a more flexible rule regarding
waiver of work product protection that will require future courts to
analyze each situation on a case-by-case basis. In Salmon Brothers,
plaintiffs requested a memorandum that Steinhardt Partners previously disclosed to the SEC in a separate investigation. 95 The SEC had
requested the memorandum as part of an investigation into possible
wrongdoings in the market for Treasury notes. Steinhardt agreed to
share the memorandum with the SEC but did not enter into a confidentiality agreement with the SEC. When civil litigants later
requested discovery of this memorandum, Steinhardt claimed that it
was protected under the work product doctrine. 96 Thus, the court
faced the issue of whether the voluntary disclosure of the memorandum to the SEC, once protected by the work product doctrine, waived
97
that protection as to subsequent civil litigants.
In its analysis, the court acknowledged that the district courts in
the Second Circuit had come to different conclusions when faced with
this issue. 98 The district court below had found that the SEC was an
adversary to Steinhardt and that Steinhardt had voluntarily disclosed
the memorandum to the SEC. 9 9 Thus, the district court held that, as a
matter of law, Steinhardt had waived its work product protection over
the memorandum. 10 0 The Second Circuit agreed that the SEC was an
adversary because "Steinhardt knew that it was the subject of an SEC
investigation, and that the memorandum was sought as a part of this
investigation."1 ' Additionally, the court agreed that the disclosure
was voluntary and "therefore distinguishable from situations in which
94 Id. at 304-06.
95 9 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1993).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 232-33.
98 Id. at 233 (citing Enron Corp. v. Borget, No. 88 Civ. 2828 (DNE), 1990 WL
144879, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990) (waiver of work product protection); Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (disclosure to SEC waived attorney-client privilege); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,
85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Eighth Circuit law and holding attorney-client privilege not waived); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46,
52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no waiver of work product protection)).
99 Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 234.
100 Id,
101 Id.
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obtained through compulsory legal
disclosure to an adversary is only
disagreed with the district
process." 10 2 However, the court of appeals
necessarily led to a waiver
court's decision that these two conclusions
of law.'" 3 After examining the
of work product protection as a matter
"that opposing counsel should
purpose of work product protection,
10 4
the court
thought processes,"
not enjoy free access to an attorney's
waive its
did
particular case, Steinhardt
of appeals held that, in this
"to
declined
0 5 But in so holding, the court
work product protection.
disclosures to the government
adopt a per se rule that all voluntary
1 0 6 The court explained that doing so
waive work product protection."
which the disclosing party and
would fail to anticipate situations in
interest in developing legal
the government may share a common
situations in which the SEC
theories and analyzing information, or
into an explicit agreement
and the disclosing party have entered
the disclosed
will maintain the confidentiality of
SEC
that the 10
7
materials.
will retain work product
This rationale implies that a corporation
to the SEC if it either shares a
protection over materials disclosed
if it enters into a confidentiality
common interest with the SEC or
if the corporation shares a comagreement with the SEC. However,
is probably not an adversary of the
mon interest with the SEC, the SEC
an
party discloses work product to
corporation. It is only when a
10 8 Courts have routinely
be waived.
adversary that the protection may
even when it is not conducting a
held that the SEC is an adversary
not filed any charges against a corformal investigation or when it has
has the option of doing so in the
poration on the theory that the SEC
future.10

9

Id.
Id. at 236.
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
Id. at 234 (citing Hickman v. Taylor,
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id.
U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
108 United States v. Nobles, 422
dilemma may
at 234. However, an interesting
the
109 See, e.g., Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d
requesting
is
SEC
the
correctly or not, that
arise when the corporation believes,
those
uses
later
SEC
the
If
of a third party.
that
documents as part of an investigation
the SEC is clearly an adversary at
corporation,
disclosing
the
In
documents against
disclosure.
of
been an adversary at the time
work
point. But the SEC may not have
its
retain
to
for courts to allow the corporation
situations like this, it is possible
at the time
basis that the SEC was not an adversary
the
on
product protection, either
corporation
though the SEC is an adversary, the
of disclosure or by arguing that even
issue
at the time of disclosure. This is another
had a common interest with the SEC
that has yet to be resolved.
102
103
104
105
106
107
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SEC is investigating a corThus, for all practical purposes, if the
securities laws, the only way a
poration for possible violations of the
work product protection over
corporation may be able to retain
SEC, at least in the Second Cirmaterials it voluntarily discloses to the
whereby the SEC must keep the
cuit, is to enter into an agreement
110
disclosed materials confidential.
a confidentiality agreement
For corporations in this jurisdiction,
protection because disclosure
protects from waiver of work product
such protection. Work product
has not violated the policy underlying
an attorney can work efficiently
protection is meant to ensure that
to use
that opposing counsel will be able
and effectively without fear
confia
with
1
combined
his work against him." Because disclosure
secrecy
with maintaining
dentiality agreement is not "inconsistent
should not be
protection
product
from possible adversaries," work
11 2
waived as to future adversaries.
privilege waiver did not
Although the issue of attorney-client
Brothers, the court did address the
come up before the court in Salmon
13
The court agreed with the analysis
issue in its discussion in dictum.
I 4
v. United States, 1 which rejected
of the D.C. Circuit in Permian Corp.
by the Eighth Circuit in Diversithe selective waiver theory adopted
upon voluntary disclosure to
fied.115 The court reasoned that waiver
attorney-client relationship and
the government does not harm the
should not be merely another
that "selective assertion of privilege
utilized and manipulated to gain tactibrush on an attorney's palette,
' 6
presumably gets somecal or strategic advantage." 1 A corporation
material to the SEC, and it
thing in return for disclosing privileged
the detriment it might incur
must therefore weigh that benefit against
it will disclose the privileged
in later litigation when deciding whether
17 The Second Circuit did not indimaterial or keep it confidential.
of Pivilege
& Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver
110 But see Richard M. Strassberg
of
requirement
Sarbanes-Oxley's
at 7 (noting that
Viable?, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 2003,
to
efforts
and the government's heightened
"inquiry into allegations of wrongdoing
as
act
to
counsel
effect deputizing
require counsel to assist their investigations-in
and
company
the
of
the effect of bringing the interests
private prosecutors--may have
for selective
and revitalizing this line of argument
line,
in
the government more

waiver").
111

511 (1947).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,

113

Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 235.

334, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D.
112 Stix Prods., Inc. v. United
1969).
114

115
116
117

665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 235.
Id.
Id. at 235-36.
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made when a corporation enters
cate that any exception should be
the government when disclosing
into a confidentiality agreement with
privilege. Thus, a corporamaterials protected by the attorney-client
materials protected under
tion may be able to shield from discovery
under attorney-client privilege, by
the work product doctrine, but not
negotiating for confidentiality.
arguing against the selective
The SEC submitted an amicus brief
SEC convinced the court that the
waiver doctrine in this case.ltI The
in order for corporations to
selective waiver theory was not necessary
through disclosure of matercontinue to cooperate with investigations
19 The SEC stated that
privilege.1
ials covered by the attorney-client
in many jurisdictions, corporadespite rejection of selective waiver
to disclose protected materitions were still complying with requests
disclosure to the SEC outweigh the
als.12 0 Apparently, the benefits of
detriments of privilege waiver.
IV.

OF SHIFTING
THE NINTH CIRCUIT: AN EXAMPLE
WAIVER
PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVILEGE

Circuit shifted its perspecRecently, a district court in the Ninth
of two years, this court moved
tive on the issue of waiver. In the space
for an absolute waiver of work
2
from applying a rule which provided
to an adversary' ' to a rule
product protection upon disclosure
protection where the discloallowing for retention of work product
1 2 2 The case law
agreement.
confidentiality
a
by
accompanied
was
sure
conclusion to the issue, but recent
does not yet provide a satisfying
may provide some guidance.
changes in district court reasoning
the direction of law like that of the
These decisions point attorneys in
Salmon Brothers.
Second Circuit as exemplified in
23

Approach
United States v. Bergonzi1 : The Old
California applied similar rules
In 2003, the Northern District of
decision in Tennessee Laborers.
to those applied in the Sixth Circuit's
in which former executives
United States v. Bergonzi involved a situation
for securities, mail and wire fraud
of HBO & Company were indicted
irregularities by McKesson, a
following the discovery of accounting
A.

118

Id. at 236.

119

See id.

120 Id.
216 F.R.D. 487, 498 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
121 See United States v. Bergonzi,
Inc.), No.
HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson HBOC,
122 See Aronson v. McKesson
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331,
487.
123 216 F.R.D.
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company that had recently acquired HBO.12 4 McKesson, through its
attorneys, entered into a confidentiality agreement with the SEC
agreeing to provide the internal investigation report that it was preparing while investigating these irregularities. The agreement provided that McKesson did not waive its work product or attorney-client
privileges in regard to the disclosed material.1 2-5 It further provided
that the SEC would keep the information confidential "'except to the
extent that the [SEC] determines that disclosure is otherwise required
by federal law." 1 26 Subsequently, McKesson entered into a similar
agreement with the United States Attorney's Office (USAO).127
McKesson later discovered that the USAO had inadvertently provided
some of the materials covered by its confidentiality agreement to the
former executive defendants of HBO facing the securities, mail, and
wire fraud charges. 128 McKesson requested the return of the documents from the executive defendants, and only one of them complied
with this request.' 29 As a result, the court faced the issue of whether
the noncomplying defendant had to return the documents as a result
of attorney-client or work product privileges.' 3 0
3
The court first turned to the issue of attorney-client privilege.' '
The court stated that "communications between client and attorney
for the purpose of relaying communication to a third party [are] not
13 2
confidential and not protected by the attorney-client privilege."
Thus, because the documents in question were prepared after McKesson agreed to disclose them to the government, they were never cov33
ered by attorney-client privilege.'
Next the court turned to the application of work product protection. 13 4 First, the court distinguished the applicability of attorney-client privilege from that of work product protection by pointing out
that there was no similar requirement for work product protection
that the materials are not created with the intent to disclose them to a
124
125
126

Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. (quoting the confidentiality agreement between McKesson HBOC and the

SEC).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 491-92.
130 Id. at 492.
131 Id. at 493-94.
132 Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1204-05 (C.D.
Cal. 1999)).
133 Id. at 494.
134 Id. at 494-98.
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third party. 3 5- Thus, because the materials in question were prepared
in anticipation of litigation, the court held that work product protection applied originally. 136
Finally, the court had to determine whether McKesson had
waived its work product protection, McKesson argued that it did not
waive its work product protection because it shared a common interest with the USAO. 13 7 The court rejected McKesson's common interest argument, reasoning that
the "common interest" alleged is not like the interest shared by
allied lawyers and clients who are working together in prosecuting
or defending a lawsuit. "Indeed, the Company and the Government
did not have a true common goal, as it could not have been the
Company's goal to impose liability onto itself, a consideration
38
always maintained by the government.1
It further rejected the argument that the confidentiality agreement demonstrated a common interest, noting that the "agreement
made by the Government to keep the documents was not unconditional"'139 because it provided for an exception where disclosure was
required by law. 140 The court then held that McKesson waived its
work product protection over the material in question because
"[o]nce a party has disclosed work product to one adversary, it waives
work product protection as to all other adversaries."' 4'
The court's reasoning in this case is similar to that of the Sixth
Circuit's in Tennessee Laborers, in that it held that work product protection is waived whenever there is disclosure to a third-party adversary,
despite the existence of a confidentiality agreement. However, the
court does seem to indicate that if the confidentiality agreement did
not include an exception allowing the government to disclose the documents if "otherwise required by federal law,'"142 it would have ruled
differently on this issue.1 43 This point does not provide much assistance to corporations or their counsel, as the government is hardly
likely to agree to confidentiality when federal law requires disclosure.
Even if the government did sign an agreement purporting to do such
135 Id. at 494 (citing McMorgan & Co. v. First Cal. Mortgage Co., 931 F. Supp. 703,
709 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
136 Id. at 495.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 496 (citing McMorgan, 931 F. Supp. at 703).
139 Id. at 496-97.
140 Id. at 491.
141 Id. at 498.
142 Id. at 491.
143 Id. at 494.
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in fact, federal law did require
a thing, it would not be enforceable if,
for all practical purposes, does
disclosure. Thus, this court's decision,
the corporation has entered into
not distinguish between cases where
the government and those cases
a confidentiality agreement with
where no such agreement was made.
HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson
Aronson v. McKesson
14 4 : The New Approach
HBOC, Inc.)

B.

Aronson v. McKesson
Although only a district court decision,
indicates a surprising change
HBOC, Inc. (In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.)
its own previous decision on
in jurisprudence in this area. Despite
from the Sixth Circuit decithis issue in Bergonzi following precedent
Court for the Northern District
sion in Tennessee Laborers, the District
the Second Circuit decision in
of California applied principles from
issue of waiver for the second
Salmon5 Brothers when it faced the
1 4

time.

sought discovery of the same
In McKesson, plaintiff shareholders
that
prepared by McKesson's attorneys
report and other materials
1 46 McKesson refused to comply with the
were disputed in Bergonzi.
under attorney-client privilege
discovery request, claiming protection
1 47
The court thus faced the same issue
and work product protection.
were waived upon discloof whether either or both of the privileges
sure to the SEC and the USAO.
of attorney-client privilege.
The court first addressed the issue
apply to material that was never
Attorney-client privilege does not
l . 48 McKesson agreed to disclose the
intended to be kept confidentia '
SEC and USAO before the report
report and other materials to the
49
that this privilege never applied
was prepared.1 Thus, the court held
to discuss
and there was no need
15 0 This decito the materials in the first place,
disclosure.
whether the privilege was waived by voluntary
934331 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
144 No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL
has
at 498 (holding that "[oince a party
145 Id. at *10; see Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D.
all
to
as
protection
product
it waives work
disclosed work product to one adversary,
the party
cases
these
of
both
in
Interestingly,
other adversaries" with no exceptions).
HBOC. See
materials in question was McKesson
the
over
privilege
assert
to
attempting
216 F.R.D. at 490.
McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *1; Bergonzi,
*1.
at
146 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331,
147
148
149
150

Id.

255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958)).
Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Tellier,
Id. at *1 n.3.
Id. at *5.
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sion by the court followed the same reasoning that it applied in
5

Bergonzi.1

1

There was no dispute regarding the application of work product
protection to the report and other materials, so the court focused on
the issue of waiver of this protection. 52 The court first concluded
that the government agencies were adversaries for the purpose of
waiver due to the "potential for dispute and even litigation."' 5 3 Further, although McKesson professed an interest in "pinpointing the
source of the alleged accounting misdeeds," it did not share a "sufficiently aligned" common interest with the government to make this
exception to the waiver doctrine apply to this case. 154 Under the decision in Bergonzi, these conclusions on their own would be enough to
155
deny McKesson's work product protection.
But the McKesson court continued its analysis of the waiver issue.
The court next examined whether the disclosure increased McKesson's adversaries' access to the report and back-up materials. 15 6 The

court reasoned that it could allow work product protection to stand in
157
this case without adopting the limited waiver doctrine of Diversified.
It noted that several courts have left open the issue of whether a confidentiality agreement covering disclosed materials serves to keep work

151 United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 493-94 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
152 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *5-6.
153 Id. at *6 (quoting United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st
Cir. 1997)).
154 Id. at *7.
155 Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. at 495-98.
156 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *7-10.
157 Id. at *8. The court discusses the SEC's similar view, asserted in its amicus brief
to the court:
[T] he SEC asserts that finding no waiver of work product protection pursuant to a confidentiality agreement with the government need not be construed as endorsement of the selective waiver doctrine because these cases
have recognized while rejecting the selective waiver doctrine, that disclosure
to the government pursuant to a confidentiality agreement can preserve
work product protection.
Id. at *8 n.11 (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, McKesson, No. 99-CV-20793,
2005 WL 934331). Compare this to the SEC's position in Salmon Brothers, supporting
the rejection of the selective waiver doctrine because corporations did not need such
protection in order to have motivation to disclose materials protected by attorneyclient privilege with the SEC. Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P.
(In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993). Does this imply that
the SEC believes that there is no such incentive for documents covered by work product protection?
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product protection intact.15 8 The court then explicitly rejected the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Tennessee Laborers that work product protection was waived even if the parties had agreed to confidentiality.' 5 9
Following the reasoning of Judge Boggs's dissenting opinion in Tennessee Laborers, the court agreed that "the principles of waiver
should . . .accommodate a public policy recognizing the need for

cooperation with the government where such cooperation does not
distort the adversarial relationship protected by the work product doctrine."1 60 Thus, when disclosing protected material to the government under a confidentiality agreement, the court held that work
product protection will not be waived. 16 1 The confidentiality agreement ensures that the disclosure does not undermine the policy
underlying work product protection.
Applying this to the case at bar, the court determined that McKesson did not waive its work product protection. 162 The court took "into
consideration the benefit to the public of permitting disclosure of
work product to the government and..

.

the cases... rejecting selec-

tive waiver but endorsing the preservation of work product protection
under 'negotiated confidentiality with the government." 16 3 Thus, in
the span of just two years, facing nearly the same set of facts, the
Northern District of California shifted its position considerably,
allowing work product protection to stand as a result of the confidentiality agreement between McKesson and the government.

158 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *8 ("'[E]stablishing a rigid rule (that disclosure
to the government waives work product protection] would fail to anticipate situations
in which the disclosing party and the government may share a common interest in
developing legal theories and analyzing information, or situations in which the SEC
and the disclosing party have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will
maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed materials."' (alternations in original)
(quoting Salmon Bros., 9 F.3d at 236)); id. (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that work product is preserved when parties agree to confidentiality before disclosure); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738
F.2d 1367, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that work product protection is preserved
for internal reports when not disclosed or when there is a confidentiality agreement
before disclosure).
159 McKesson, 2005 WL 934331, at *8-9.
160 Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.),
293 F.3d 289, 311 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
161 Id. Disclosure to a nongovernment entity yields the opposite result. Id.
162 Id. at *10.
163 Id.
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ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW: WHY THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA TOOK THE BEST APPROACH

Until the Supreme Court decides these issues, each circuit is on
its own to determine which of these approaches it will take, or if it will
choose to create a new approach. When examining the reasoning of
these different courts, it becomes clear that some approaches have
more support than others.
A.

Should Courts Apply the Limited Waiver Doctrine?

The Eighth Circuit in Diversified did not give much legal support
for its decision that attorney-client privilege was not waived upon disclosure to the government. In its creation of the limited waiver doctrine, the court simply cited two cases with no discussion of their
relevance.1 6 4 The first case the court cited, Bucks County Bank & Trust
Co. v. Storck,165 held that testimony from a hearing on a motion to
return property obtained in an illegal search and seizure did not waive
attorney-client privilege as to the information in the testimony and
therefore could not be used against a defendant in a criminal case.' 66
The second case the court cited, United States v. Goodman,16 7 discussed
waiver of Fifth Amendment privileges in a subsequent criminal investigation when there has been prior disclosure to investigating
officials. 168
These two cases do not mandate the conclusion in Diversified.
There are different policy considerations underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege than those of attorney-client privilege, The Fifth
Amendment exists to protect an "individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records."1 6 This policy
is unrelated to that of the attorney-client privilege, which is to foster
communication between attorney and client. 170 Additionally, two
completely different sets of rules govern procedure in federal civil and
criminal cases. Further, the rules regarding admissibility of evidence
in a criminal case may differ from the rules regarding admissibility in
164
banc).
165
166
167
168
169

Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969).
Id. at 1123.
289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
Id. at 259.
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) (quoting United States v.

White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).

170

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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civil cases.17 1 Thus, the Eighth Circuit cites to no precedent that mandates its conclusion in Diversified.
The court instead relied, for the most part, on the policy argument that not creating such a doctrine would "thwart[ ] the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers." 72 In 1977, when the
court wrote this decision, this policy argument may have been persuasive, but in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley's regulations relating to independent audit committees, 73 this argument simply does not hold
much weight. Sarbanes-Oxley set up rules for independent audit committees that the SEC implemented in Rule 1OA-3.1 74 Rule 10A-3
requires publicly traded companies to have independent audit committees that have established procedures for reviewing complaints,
allowing confidential submissions of concerns about accounting or
auditing violations, and also requires that the committee have the
authority to retain independent counsel or other advisors.17 5 As a
result, the concern highlighted by the Eighth Circuit that disallowing
limited waiver of attorney-client privilege would keep corporations
from obtaining independent audits or independent counsel no longer
applies in today's business climate.
The validity of the Eighth Circuit's point is further undermined
by the ever increasing use of internal investigations by corporations. 1 6
Because corporations' regular practice now includes creating internal
investigations, 77 courts should not create rules of law simply to
ensure this practice continues. All of the changes in law and in corporate governance that have occurred since 1977 point to the conclusion that the selective waiver doctrine is not necessary to ensure that
corporations retain independent counsel and investigate their own
possible accounting violations: The law already requires corporations
to do this.
171 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404 (distinguishing evidence admissible in criminal cases
relating to character).
172 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
173 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 1997 & Supp.
2006).
174 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2006).
175 Id.
176 See Anne C. Flannery &Jennifer S. Milano, The Confusion Continues: Protectionof
Internal CorporateInvestigation Materials Under the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, Revisited, 1023 PLI/Corp 519, 523 (1997).
177 Id.
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Additionally, and most importantly, the limited waiver doctrine
does not further the policy underlying attorney-client privilege. The
ultimate purpose of this privilege is to encourage clients to speak
freely with their attorneys. 78 When a corporation, after disclosing
information to its attorney, decides to disclose the same information
to third parties, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege has
already been satisfied. Because clients choose when they will or will
not disclose privileged material to a third party, a waiver of privilege as
a result of such a disclosure in no way affects the corporation's initial
decision to consult with its attorney. Waiver of this privilege is in the
hands of the client, to do with as it pleases. No matter what choice a
corporation makes about subsequent disclosure, providing for waiver
of the privilege upon disclosure provides no deterrent for the corporation to discuss the underlying legal issues with its attorney. This
argument holds true whether or not the corporation negotiates with
the government for a confidentiality agreement, because at that point
it has already conferred with its attorney.
Thus, courts in undecided circuits, although free to do as they
choose as of now, should not apply the limited waiver doctrine
espoused by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified. Upon disclosure to the
government of material once protected by attorney-client privilege,
the privilege ought not apply in subsequent litigation, regardless of
any confidentiality agreements the corporation may have entered into
with the government.
B.

Should Courts Apply Sixth or Second Circuit Precedent
When Handling Work Product Waiver Issues?

Courts have the option of choosing to follow either the Sixth or
the Second Circuit's lead when faced with waiver of work product protection. If a court applies Sixth Circuit precedent, it will follow the
rule that when a corporation discloses protected material to the government, and the government can be considered an adversary, the
material will no longer be protected from discovery by third parties,
despite any other circumstances. 179 If a court follows the example of
the Second Circuit, it will allow work product protection to stand
where the corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement
178 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
179 Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
(In re Colurnbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289, 304-06
(6th Cir. 2002).
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with the government, protecting the work product from discovery by
third parties. 18 0
Examination of the policy underlying the work product doctrine
provides support for the Second Circuit's approach to this issue,
which allows protection when the parties have entered a confidentiality agreement. The Supreme Court explained that the work product
doctrine is meant to restrict opposing counsel's ability to piggyback
on an attorney's work. 8" It is also meant to ensure that attorneys can
effectively represent their clients without worrying about discovery of
their work in the future.1

82

The court wanted to ensure that attorneys

felt free to write their work down.'8 3 The law provides for waiver of
this protection upon voluntary disclosure to an adversary, 8 4 and the
parties are free to choose whether they disclose in this way.
These policies underlying work product protection do not necessarily demand that waiver should apply when the disclosing party has
negotiated for confidentiality. A client's determination to provide
work product to the government should not lead to the conclusion
that any other opposing party should also be able to take advantage of
the attorney's work. If the attorney has taken appropriate steps to
maintain the confidentiality of the information as to third parties,
then the attorney has not violated the policy underlying work product
protection through such a disclosure. The attorney may have allowed
the government to benefit from his work, but this does not imply that
the attorney should allow every other opposing counsel the same benefit. As a result, the policy reasons for protecting work product still
apply to other adversaries.
Additionally, third parties seeking discovery of material disclosed
to the government have the option of arguing that discovery of protected material is appropriate where there is a substantial need for the
5
materials and the information cannot be obtained any other way.' 8
This is the same rule that would apply if these parties were the first to
180 Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993).
181 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
185 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. This brings up the issue, however, of how future
adversaries will even know what sort of information is disclosed in the protected documents in order to argue that there is a substantial need for the materials and that the
information cannot be obtained through other means. Given that this issue is common to all cases where discovery of any sort of work product is desired, this issue is
one that is not unique to this particular situation.
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attempt to discover otherwise protected attorney work product. 8 6
Thus, the provision of work product to the government would have no
effect on the ability of third parties to discover such materials.
This rule will also encourage corporations to cooperate with the
government. If corporations feel confident that their attorney work
product will remain confidential as to third parties, they are more
likely to disclose it to the government, a "laudable activity" in the eyes
of the Second Circuit.18 7 Encouraging cooperation with the government will make it easier for agencies like the SEC and the DOJ to
investigate corporations and ensure compliance with criminal and
securities laws.
As a result, courts will uphold the policy underlying the work
product doctrine by following the lead of the Second Circuit in
Salmon Brothers and allowing retention of work product protection
where the corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement
with the SEC.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the many different approaches to the doctrines of
waiver of attorney-client privilege and waiver of work product protection shows that the best approach is that taken by the Second Circuit
and, most recently, by the Northern District of California. Allowing
corporations to selectively waive attorney client privilege does not
comport with the policy underlying the privilege, but allowing work
product protection to stand after disclosure under a confidentiality
agreement does not violate the policy goals of work product protection. This approach also encourages corporations to cooperate with
the government. Given that this issue is not settled, corporations and
their attorneys must be aware that many courts have the option to pick
and choose which rules they will apply. As a result of this uncertainty,
attorneys should advise their corporate clients of the different possibilities and, if their clients choose to disclose protected materials to
the government, should negotiate with the government for a confidentiality agreement in order to protect their client as much as possible. Until the Supreme Court decides what rules will ultimately
govern these issues, attorneys must prepare their clients for all possible situations.

186
187

Id.
Salmon Bros. Treasury Litig. v. Steinhardt Partners, L.P. (In re Steinhardt Part-

ners, L.P.), 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Perrnian Corp. v. United States, 665

F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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